Increasing risk disclosure of banks, e. g. via risk reporting in their annual accounts, is high on the agenda. In this paper, we analyse whether risk reporting of banks only shows favourable e ects as supposed by regulatory authorities or whether there exist undesired e ects as well. Referring to the literature on deposit contracts and bank runs, we concentrate on the impact on depositors' withdrawal decisions and banks' asset risk. Risk reporting does not generally lead to a decrease in banks' risk exposure and the probability of bank runs, respectively. Instead it induces higher risk exposure under certain conditions, which are identi ed in this paper.
Introduction
Since the implementation of the Law on Corporate Control and Transparency (KonTraG) in 1998, German banks have to report on their risk in their annual reports (see 289 I, 315 I German Commercial Code (HGB) ). This rule is supplemented by the German Accounting Standards GAS 5 Risk Reporting and GAS 5-10 Risk Reporting of Banks , which has been the rst accounting standard worldwide that regulates risk reporting in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, bank regulators promote enhanced transparency to support market discipline as a new, complementary element of bank regulation (see, e. g., the third pillar of Basel II).As one of the relevant regulatory requirements, increased risk dislosure should help to restrict banks' risk-taking.
In this paper, we analyse whether risk reporting of banks only shows favourable e ects as supposed by the regulatory authorities or whether there exist some undesired e ects as well. Hirshleifer (1971) has already shown that additional information does not have to be bene cial but may lead to negative consequences. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the e ects of a special kind of information, namely information about risk and especially the risk reporting of banks. As deposits are typical of banks, we concentrate on the depositors' reactions: How are the depositors' decisions to withdraw their money or to keep it in the bank in uenced by the bank's risk reporting? Additionally, we look at the reaction of the bank to possible changes in the depositors' behaviour.
There is only little literature on the e ects of risk reporting. Some empirical work on capital markets reactions to risk disclosure is done by Rajgopal (1999) , Linsmeier et al. (2000) , Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (1999) , and Thornton and Welker (2000) , but they do not consider banks. The only paper comparable to ours is the analytical work of Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) . They show that risk disclosure may increase the ex ante probability of bank insolvency. However, they use some quite restrictive assumptions as uniformly distributed asset returns, and even more importantly, they do not model the characteristics of deposits. In this paper we choose a more general framework insofar as we abstract from a special distribution over asset returns. At the same time we are more speci c including main features of deposits, thereby trying to combine accounting theory and the theory of nancial intermediation.
Our work is related to the literature on deposit contracts and bank runs. Referring to the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) we model a bank that takes deposits from depositors with di erent time preferences for consumption but cannot observe these preferences and invests its total funds in illiquid assets. However, this basic model is extended 1 in several aspects. Firstly, we consider risky assets. Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) were among the rst who assumed risky assets to derive so-called information-based bank runs, i. e. bank runs that were driven by (asymmetrically distributed) information about asset returns. In the models with ex ante risky assets it is usually assumed that the depositors receive a signal (sometimes with noise) on the true value of asset returns before they make their withdrawal decisions. 1 In this paper, however, uncertainty is not resolved before the end of the planning period, i. e. not before asset returns are actually paid. Instead the depositors receive some interim information about asset risk as the bank reports on the values of selected downside risk measures. We s h o w that the expected shortfall (Lower Partial Moment O n e , LPM 1 ) and the target semivariance (Lower Partial Moment Two, LPM 2 ) are the risk measures relevant for the depositors' withdrawal decisions.
Secondly, we introduce shareholders to model the characteristics of banks and their deposits.
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The depositors are no longer residual claimants but get a xed return provided that the bank does not go bankrupt. Excess returns are paid to the shareholders. Equity is assumed to bejust so high that pure panic runs as described by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) will not occur. So we can concentrate on bank runs that are based on the bank's risk reporting or the depositors' expectation concerning asset risk.
Thirdly and most importantly, the purposes are di erent. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and the subsequent papers that show variations of their basic model intend to derive a deposit contract that optimises risk sharing between depositors. In our paper, however, a standard deposit contract is by assumption exogenously given to concentrate on (the change in) depositors' withdrawal decisions due to risk reporting.
We start our analysis with the analytical more convenient case of risk reporting. The bank discloses information on its risk exposure and at the same time has to decide whether to adjust the return on deposits, e. g. to prevent a bank run. This scenario is compared with a scenario without risk reporting where a game of incomplete information between bank 1 In Allen and Gale (1998) and Drehmann (2002) , e. g., all depositors know t h e true value of asset returns before they make their withdrawal decisions. Carletti (1999) , Chari and Jagannathan (1988) , Chen (1999) , Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) , Jacklin (1989) , and Jacklin (1993) assume that at least a fraction of depositors is perfectly informed. A signal with noise is modelled by Boonprakaikawe and Ghosal (2001) , Dasgupta (2001) , Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) , Gorton (1985) , and Rochet and Vives (2002) . In Alonso (1996) , Bougheas (1999) , Calomiris and Kahn (1991) , Chen (1994) , Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) , Loewy (1998), and Wolf (1999) the depositors update the discrete probability distribution over asset returns. However, the random returns may o n l y t a k e t wo v alues. Continuous distribution functions and risk measures other than the probability o f t h e low return are not considered.
As Dowd (1992) , p. 112, put it, the demand deposits of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) are a kind of debt-equity h ybrid because the depositors who leave their deposits in the bank until the nal period only get a residual payment. The intermediary is more like a m utual fund than a bank .
2 and depositors has to be analysed. In this game di erent kinds of equilibria are possible depending on the parameters of the model. On the one hand, pooling equilibria may be observed, in which an average return on deposits is agreed upon regardless of the bank's asset risk. No bank run will occur. On the other hand, equilibria with adverse selection may exist: Only in case of high asset risk, the bank o ers an adequate return on deposits. Otherwise, it will leave the market.
Provided that without risk reporting there exists a pooling equilibrium, risk reporting leads to higher asset risk of rather risky types of banks (or to a bank run on these banks) while reducing the risk of a bank with already quite low asset risk. If, however, in case of no risk reporting only the riskiest types of banks o er a return on deposits so that the deposits are not withdrawn, risk reporting may help to prevent this adverse selection. According to these results, risk reporting does not generally decrease banks' risk exposure or lessen the probability of bank runs, but may lead to an increase in insolvency risk of risky banks. Such an ex post increase in the risk exposure of a rather risky bank is the more likely, the less risk averse the depositors, the smaller the return on assets in case of early liquidation, the higher the a priori probability o f l o w asset risk, and the smaller the range of possible levels of asset risk. We also derive conditions under which a bank's risk exposure in case of risk reporting is ex ante higher than in the scenario without risk reporting.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the basic assumptions and time structure of our model. Section 3 shows the equilibrium behaviour of the bank and its depositors if the bank reports on its asset risk. The equilibrium behaviour in the benchmark scenario without risk reporting is analysed in Section 4. In Section 5 the results of both scenarios are compared to derive the e ects of risk reporting. Section 6 provides a summary and outlook.
The Model Basic Assumptions
Risk reporting of a monopolistic bank, which holds deposits and equity, is analysed in a three period model with T = 0 1 2. In period T = 0 each depositor is endowed with one dollar. We assume a continu u m o f u n i t m a s s o f e x a n te identical, risk averse depositors. The utility function u( ) is strictly increasing and strictly concave and equals (or may at least be approximated by) a second-degree polynomial. According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) there exist two types of depositors. Type 1 (2) wants to consume at T = 1 (T = 2).
3 In period T = 1 each depositor learns his type only. However, the fraction of type 1, t 2 (0 1), and thus the a priori probability of beingtype 1 are publicly known at T = 0. For each dollar deposited the bank promises to pay d 1 (d 2 ) provided that the depositor withdraws at T = 1 (T = 2 ). The deposit contract agreed upon at T = 0 is exogenously given with
With d 1 > 1 the depositors of type 1 obtain more than the invested dollar. If d 1 d 2 , the depositors of type 2 would in any case withdraw their money at T = 1 and store it privately until T = 2 . Depositors' decisions would be independent o f a n y (risk) information about the bank and hence trivial. The deposit contract is neither contingent on depositors' type, which is not publicly observable, nor on bank's risk. Moreover, the depositors can withdraw their deposits at any time. Thus we use a standard (demand) deposit contract.
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In compensation for the depositors' right to withdraw at any time, the bank has got the option to change the promised return d 2 at T = 1 .
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With this option we take into account another important f e a t u r e of demand deposit contracts.
To model the characteristics of banks, the bank does not only issue deposits but also raises equity, C , at T = 0. In reality, banks have to raise a certain amount of equity to receive the bank charter thus being able to issue deposits. Moreover, there exist regulatory restrictions such as Basel I or II that require a minimum amount of equity to hold risky assets. The risk neutral shareholders have limited liability. They are the residual claimants. In non-bankruptcy states at T = 2 the shareholders get the bank's nal net worth whereas the depositors obtain a xed repayment of their deposits, which is d 2 (per depositor). The shareholders know for sure that they will consume at T = 2 . The bank's equity, C , cannot beincreased or reduced until T = 2 . The shareholders and bank managers are identical so that agency con icts between bank (owners) and managers are excluded.
7
At T = 0 the bank invests its total funds in risky, illiquid assets. The random return at 3 Dowd (1992) , Drehmann (2002) , Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), and Hellwig (1994) , also assume corner preferences. See also Drehmann (2002) and Rochet and Vives (2002) , who take the deposit contracts as given and analyse depositors' withdrawal decisions. The deposit contract shows similar properties than the optimal deposit contract of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . In case of riskless asset returns, they derive the optimal deposit contract with 1 < d 1 < d 2 < R .
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The typical deposit contract is`noncontingent' , Allen and Gale (1998), p. 1256. 6 Notice that d 2 is a variable in our model. The symbold v 2 is used if we refer to the level of d 2 agreed upon in T = 0 .
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For the assumptions concerning bank shareholders see also Dowd (1992) , p. 124 f., and Wolf (1999), p. 274-279. Rochet and Vives (2002) also introduce shareholders in their analysis of the depositors' withdrawal decisions but do not further characterise these shareholders. They state rightly that a proper modeling of the role of equityholders remains to be done , Rochet and Vives (2002), p. 12. 4 T = 2 (per invested dollar), R, is continuously distributed over the interval 0 R] and not known before realisation at T = 2. If assets are liquidated at T = 1, they earn a riskless but rather low return (per invested dollar) of r 2 (0 1]. In period T = 1 the bank knows the expected return, E R] > 1, and always reports on this value. With this assumption we isolate the impact of risk reporting on depositors' behaviour from the impact of information about expected returns. At T = 1, the bank also obtains information about asset risk. It knows the (continuous) distribution function over asset returns, F (R), and hence the Lower Partial Moments, LPM i ( ), for a given target, R k 2 0 R]. They are de ned as follows:
dF (R) i = 0 1 2 : : : Without risk reporting the depositors cannot observe asset risk.
For analytical convenience, we assume that all but one parameters of the distribution function are common knowledge. 8 Moreover, common priors are assumed, i. e. the bank and its depositors know the a priori probability of the unknown parameter , p( ), and the set of all possible values of , . At T = 1 the bank is informed about . In this paper risk reporting means that the bank reports on the expected shortfall, LPM 1 (R k ), and the target semivariance, LPM 2 (R k ).
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Both are a function of the target R k as well as of . LPM 1 (R k ) is positively related to :
where the inequality holds strictly for at least some values of R k . The maximum of , 2 , characterises maximum risk insofar as, for a g i v en R k , LPM 1 (R k ) reaches its maximum.
Time Structure
The time structure of our model is as follows (see also Figure 1 , p. 31): In period T = 0 the bank is founded by the shareholders. Depositors place their money in the bank. Total capital is invested in risky assets. As we concentrate on a bank with deposit contracts that already exist, the decisions in period T = 0 are taken as given. Instead we look at the behaviour of the bank and its depositors in the following period.
In period T = 1 nature chooses asset risk, which is observed by the bank. Alternatively we consider two scenarios: In the rst scenario the bank truly reports on asset risk, e. g. to 8 Notice that the expected return, E R], cannot be the unknown parameter because E R] is common knowledge at T = 1 .
9
Below w e de ne R k and show that the risk measures relevant for the depositors' withdrawal decision are indeed LPM 1 (R k ) and LPM 2 (R k ).
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comply with regulatory restrictions. In the benchmark scenario the bank does not disclose asset risk so that there exists a game of incomplete information between bank and depositors, which, however, can betransformed into a game of imperfect information (Harsanyi, 1967/8) . Depending on asset risk, di erent t ypes of banks are distinguished.
In both scenarios the bank informs about the expected value of asset returns. Moreover, the bank may o er an adjustment of the return on deposits, d 2 . The bank has to decide how to change d 2 to maximise its expexted net worth at T = 2. The fear of the bank's illiquidity caused by too many deposits withdrawn at T = 1 is the main reason why panic runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 ) may exist. To concentrate on information-based bank runs we rule out the possibility o f panic runs by assuming that equity is just so high or the debt-to-equity ratio is so low that the bank can repay all deposits (w = 1 ) in period T = 1 :
With (2) 6 In period T = 2 the returns on these assets are realised. The depositors who have not withdrawn early obtain the promised return, d 2 , provided the bank is solvent. The shareholders receive the bank's nal net worth. The bank is solvent a t T = 2 if the returns on assets that were not liquidated at T = 1 are at least as high as the promised returns on deposits not yet withdrawn:
Referring to the sign of equality in (3), the return critical for bank solvency at T = 2 is de ned as 
Equilibrium Behaviour With Risk Reporting
In this section we h a ve a closer look at bank behaviour and depositors' decisions 11 at T = 1 . The bank learns its asset risk. It gets information about the value of thus knowing LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ) and reports on the values of these downside risk measures. Besides, it has to decide whether to o er an adjustment of the promised return on deposits, d 2 , anticipating the depositors' reactions to such an adjustment a n d t o t h e risk disclosure.
A depositor who decides whether to withdraw at T = 1 knows that, according to (2), the bank can pay out all depositors at T = 1. Therefore, it will not beilliquid as long as the depositor himself keeps his deposit in the bank. Even if all other depositors withdrew 10 We use the terms illiquidity and insolvency to clarify whether the bank fails in period T = 1 or T = 2 . The bank is called illiquid if there are too many depositors who want to withdraw their deposits at T = 1 . A bank is insolvent if asset returns at T = 2 are too low compared with the bank's liabilities.
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As type 1 withdraws at T = 1 regardless of any information about asset risk, we restrict our analysis to the behaviour of type 2 depositors and call them simply depositors . their money, the depositor would get d 1 if he withdrew as well. For this reason the return on deposits at T = 1 is riskless whereas the return at T = 2 is still risky. The depositor waits until T = 2 if the expected utility of the return at T = 2 is at least as high as the utility o f d 1 :
The depositors' decisions are independent o f w and thus of the behaviour of other depositors. The depositors follow dominant strategies.
Using integration by parts the expected utility of the return at T = 2 can be transformed into (see appendix A.1, p. 21)
where F n] ( ) results from integrating F ( ) n times. u (i) ( ) symbolises the ith derivative of the utility function. Since we assume that the utility function may at least be approximated by a second-degree polynomial, condition (4) can berewritten as (5) m (d 2 ) equals the di erence between the expected utility o f w aiting until T = 2 , E u( )], and the utility of withdrawing at T = 1 , u(d 1 ). It depends on the expected shortfall, LPM 1 ( ), and the target semivariance, LPM 2 ( ), w h i c h are disclosed by the bank. The return critical for bank solvency, R k , is the relevant target. Usually E u( )] is lower than u(d 2 ) because d 2 is only paid in solvency states.
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The higher LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ), the lower is E u( )] and hence the di erence m (d 2 ). Given the return d 2 , the depositors decide to wait provided that asset risk is su ciently low s o that m (d 2 ) is nonnegative.
14 Alternatively a depositor's withdrawal decision may be described as a function of the promised return, d 2 , given the realised value of . m (d 2 ) strictly increases in d 2 as long as the shortfall probablility, LPM 0 ( ), is lower than 1:
12 Notice that w < 1 and thus R k = d 2 r=d 1 because by calculating the expected utility of waiting until T = 2 , the depositor assumes that he himself does not withdraw a t T = 1 .
Only if assets are riskless (LPM 1 ( ) = LPM 2 ( ) = 0 ), it holds that E u( )] = u(d 2 ).
14 By assumption the depositors wait until T = 2 according to their preferences for consumption if they are indi erent b e t ween withdrawal at T = 1 and waiting until T = 2 .
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Even though the critical return for bank solvency, R k = d 2 r = d 1 , and thus LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ) increase in d 2 , a high d 2 is optimal for the depositors. For a given it holds that the higher d 2 and thus R k , t h e higher is the depositors' part of asset returns and the lower is the shareholders' part. As @ 2 m (d 2 )=@d 2 2 < 0, m (d 2 ) reaches its maximum value if d 2 is so high that the bank is insolvent a t T = 2 with probability o n e , i . e . LPM 0 ( ) = 1 . Then a further increase in d 2 has no e ect on the depositors' behaviour. They will get all asset returns at T = 2 regardless of the realised value of R because the bank will go bankrupt in any case. There is nothing left for the shareholders.
Depending on the return d 2 o ered by the bank, the depositors' behaviour at T = 1 can bewritten as follows:
where d m 2 is implicitly de ned by m (d m 2 ) = 0. Only if the risk premium is high enough (compared to the risk disclosed), depositors are willing to keep their deposits in the bank (w = t). Otherwise we will observe a total bank run (w = 1 ).
In period T = 1 the bank maximises expected net worth at T = 2. The nal net worth equals the di erence between asset returns and promised returns on deposits not yet withdrawn (see also eq. (3)) provided that the bank is liquid at T = 1 and solvent a t T = 2 . Taking into account the depositors' reactions described above w e can calculate the expected nal net worth as (see appendix A.2, p. 22)
If only the depositors of type 1 withdraw their deposits (w = t), E V (d 2 w )] may be positive. The expected shortfall, LPM 1 (R k ), is the relevant risk measure. The higher , holding R k constant, the higher is LPM 1 (R k ) at least for some R k 2 0 R] , and the higher is the expected nal net worth because, due to its limited liability, the bank has to pay less to depositors at T = 2. If all depositors withdraw at T = 1 (w = 1), the bank will be liquidated. The nal net worth is zero.
The bank, which reports on the true values of LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ), a n ticipates whether the depositors prefer to withdraw o r t o wait. The bank can prevent a bank run by o ering a return d 2 which ful lls the inequality in (7). This might beoptimal although, for w = t and LPM 0 ( ) < 1, the expected nal net worth decreases in d 2 :
Result 1 The bank will pay the return d m 2 , which prevents a bank run (w = t), if its expected nal net worth, E V (d m 2 t )], is higher than in case of a total bank run (w = 1) and thus higher than zero. The expected nal net worth is equal to zero if and only if the shortfall probability, LPM 0 (d m 2 r = d 1 ), equals one. That means the return on deposits required by depositors to keep their deposits at the bank is so high that irrespective o f R the bank goes bankrupt at T = 2 .
If the bank does not o er d m 2 due to LPM 0 (d m 2 r = d 1 ) = 1 , the bank will either be liquidated at T = 1 or insolvent at T = 2. A return on deposits initially agreed upon and still valid at T = 1 that is lower than d m 2 leads to a risk-based bank run at T = 1.
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This bank run is caused by the information about asset risk related to the risk premium o ered by the bank. From the depositors' point of view, the risk is too high for the contracted return on deposits. If at T = 0 the bank and its depositors have agreed upon a return, d v 2 , that is higher than d m 2 , the bank becomes insolvent a t T = 2 irrespective of the realised value of R. The depositors decide to wait until T = 2 as the expected utility of the liquidation value of bank assets (per deposit) is as high as the utility of withdrawal. Bank solvency at T = 2 would only bepossible if the return on deposits fell below d m 2 . However, depositors would not accept such an o er but withdraw their deposits at T = 1 . Therefore, the bank refrains from changing the return on deposits.
Equilibrium Behaviour Without Risk Reporting
In this section the benchmark scenario without risk reporting is analysed. In period T = 1 the bank receives the same information as in the previous scenario. Again it has to decide whether to adjust the return on deposits anticipating the depositors' reactions to such an adjustment. The depositors are not informed on asset risk but have certain prior beliefs.
Given the return on deposits, d 2 , and based on the a priori probabilities, p( ), a depositor decides not to withdraw his deposit at T = 1 if the di erence between the expected utility of the return at T = 2 and the utility o f d 1 is nonnegative:
If we compare condition (11) with condition (5), it becomes clear that the depositors' decisions are no longer based on (the true values of) LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ) but on their beliefs
Like in the scenario with risk reporting, waiting until T = 2 becomes more advantageous (or less disadvantageous) when d 2 increases,
The depositors decide to withdraw if the return d 2 is so low that o (d 2 p ( )) is negative. Thus it holds for o (d o 2 p ( )) = 0:
The depositors' behaviour depends on their beliefs, which, however, could change because of the decision of the bank. The depositors update their beliefs if the return on deposits o ered by the bank at T = 1 provides some information on asset risk. Then d 2 serves as a signal for LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ), a n d in (11) p( ) is substituted by p( jd 2 ).
The bank maximises its expected nal net worth. Taking into account (13) and (14) As (10) still holds, the expected nal net worth decreases in d 2 (for w = t and LPM 0 ( ) < 
Whether the inequalities in (16) are ful lled for any type of bank, i. e. for any 2 and hence for any LPM 1 ( ), is decisive for the equilibrium in the game between bank and depositors.
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In the following we will show that di erent kinds of equilibria are possible.
Result 2 In a pooling equilibrium the inequalities in (16) are ful lled for all LPM 1 ( ) and thus for all 2 . Regardless of its asset risk, the bank always sends the same signal o ering d o 2 . Therefore, the depositors are not able to update their prior beliefs. Moreover, it holds that LPM 0 (R k ) < 1 for all R k < R and for all . The expected return, E R], is publicly known and therefore constant.
Notice that E R] is publicly known and hence the same for all types of banks. Therefore, an increase in leads to a mean preserving spread.
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LPM 1 (R k ) may b e geometrically interpreted as the area under the curve o f F(R) between 0 and R k . Notice that the shortfall probability decreases in for all R k 2 (E R] R): LPM 0 (R k j 1 ) > LPM 0 (R k j 2 ) > LPM 0 (R k j 3 ).
As )] = 0, the depositors' behaviour is somewhat di erent. The return on deposits agreed upon at T = 0 induces bankruptcy at T = 2 irrespective of the realised value of asset returns whereas the reduction necessary for the possibility of bank solvency at T = 2 would lead to a bank run and thus liquidation 13 at T = 1 . As the bank cannot improve E V ( )], it does not o er d o 2 but stick to the old return on deposits, d v 2 . Because of d v 2 > d o 2 the depositors decide not to withdraw a t T = 1 but wait for the liquidation value of the insolvent bank at T = 2 . A b a n k run that induces the banks with lower asset risk to leave the market at T = 1 cannot beobserved. Instead these types of banks will go bankrupt at T = 2 , thus leaving the market at T = 2 .
If the critical return on deposits that is based on the depositors' prior beliefs equals the initially contracted return, d o 2 = d v 2 , another pooling equilibrium can beobserved. In this case the lowest value of d 2 that prevents a bank run at T = 1 has already beencontracted at T = 0 . Therefore, the bank has no incentive t o c hange it and does not o er a new return on deposits. It always sends the same signal regardless of its asset risk. In the example of Table 2 , p. 33, and Table 3 
E ects of Risk Reporting
In equilibrium a bank reporting on its asset risk o ers a return on deposits, d m 2 , w h i c h is just high enough to prevent a (risk-based) bank run, provided that the expected nal net worth is still positive. If the bank does not inform about asset risk, di erent kinds of equilibria are possible. A pooling equilibrium may be observed, i. e. at T = 1 each t ype of bank o ers the same return on deposits, d o 2 . The depositors keep their deposits in the bank. Besides, we have found equilibria where only the riskiest types of banks o er an adequate return on deposits whereas less risky types leave the market. In the following, let us assume that the bank has not disclosed its asset risk so far and now risk reporting is introduced. What are the e ects of risk reporting?
Result 5 Provided that without risk reporting each type of bank o ers the same return on deposits and no bank run occurs (pooling equilibrium), risk reporting leads to a higher risk exposure of rather risky types of banks (or to a bank run on these banks) while reducing the risk exposure of banks with already quite low asset risk.
Proof: See appendix A.7, p. 25.
On the one hand, a bank with higher asset risk than a priori expected has to pay a higher return on deposits in case of risk reporting than without risk reporting (d m On the other hand, a quite riskless bank may reduce the return on deposits without increasing the danger of a bank run if it reports on its asset risk. As a consequence insolvency risk of this already rather riskless bank is lower in case of risk reporting than without risk reporting. However, this reduction in insolvency risk cannot be observed if without risk reporting the bank is already riskless, which means that the promised return, d o 2 , is so low that LPM 0 (R k ) = LPM 1 (R k ) = LPM 2 (R k ) = 0. Then depositors will get d o 2 at T = 2 irrespective of the realised value of asset returns.
If we suppose a lemon equilibrium or partial pooling as described in Result 3, risk reporting helps to overcome the problem of adverse selection. Not only very risky types of banks, but also banks with lower asset risk are able to continue their business until T = 2 because they can credibly communicate their low risk. Therefore, a rather riskless bank can pay a l o wer return on deposits than in equilibrium without risk reporting. As the depositors know the true asset risk, they are willing to keep their deposits in the bank if it promises to pay d m 2 at T = 2. Provided that its expected nal net worth is positive, which means 15 that the bank will not automatically go bankrupt at T = 2 (LPM 0 (d m 2 r = d 1 ) < 1), the bank indeed o ers d m 2 . Then bank runs do not take place at T = 1 . To sum up, risk reporting may reduce the banks' risk exposure (or reduce the possibility of bank runs), but also raise the risk exposure of certain types of banks (or increase the possibility o f bank runs on these types). Which of these e ects actually occurs depends on the benchmark scenario and hence on the parameters of the model. An increase in risk can only beobserved if without risk reporting there exists a pooling equilibrium and the bank is rather risky. The impact of the return on deposits agreed upon at T = 0 can be seen in 
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Proof: See appendix A.8, p. 26.
The parameters mentioned in a), b), and c) in uence the return on deposits, d o 2 , which is necessary to prevent a bank run in case of no risk disclosure. The lower this return, the more likely it is that less risky types of banks may also beable to o er d o 2 thus gaining a positive expected net worth at T = 2 . Therefore, a pooling equilibrium becomes more likely.
Depositors who are not so much risk averse require a rather low risk premium. As a consequence, the critical return on deposits, d o 2 , is quite low. As an example, take the data from Tables 2 and 3 ( 2 ) a q u i t e l o w return on assets in period T = 1 , r, implies c. p. a rather low level of the debt-to-equity ratio. Therefore, the return on assets critical for bank solvency, R k , is rather low a s w ell. The lower r, the lower is R k , the higher is the depositors' expected utility of waiting until T = 2, and nally the lower is the critical return on deposits that prevents a bank run.
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If a priori the probability o f l o w asset risk is high and accordingly the probability o f h i g h asset risk is low, the depositors expect ex ante rather low asset risk. Therefore, the return on deposits that is critical for waiting until T = 2 is not that high. The examples in Tables  1, 2 , and 3, which di er in p( ), t h us leading to di erent equilibria, support this statement.
The argument behind d) is somewhat di erent: The true asset risk of a bank, LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ), usually deviates from the depositors' prior beliefs, L b PM 1 ( ) and L b PM 2 ( ). Therefore, d o 2 , which is based on the prior beliefs, is di erent from d m 2 , which is calculated knowing asset risk. The smaller the di erence between highest and lowest possible values of LPM 1 ( ) and LPM 2 ( ), the smaller is c. p. the possible deviation of low asset risk from prior beliefs. As a consequence, d o 2 does not di er very much from d m 2 so that a pooling equilibrium in the scenario without risk reporting is more plausible.
So far we have analysed how insolvency risk of certain types of banks in case of risk reporting di ers from insolvency risk if these banks do not report on their risk. We have shown that ex post a bank's risk exposure may behigher with risk reporting than without risk reporting. Additionally we can identify conditions under which the ex ante risk exposure 19 Notice that the impact of a change of d 1 on the kind of equilibrium in the scenario without risk reporting is not clear. It can easily be shown that a rise in d 1 increases the expected utility of waiting until T = 2 . But at the same time it increases the utility o f w i t h d r a wing the deposits at T = 1 so that it is not clear whether the bank has to raise the return on deposits at T = 2 , d 2 , t o prevent a bank run. may increase. As a necessary condition, a pooling equilibrium must exist when the bank does not report on its risk.
Result 8 Provided that without risk reporting a bank o ers the same return on deposits irrespective of its asset risk (pooling equilibrium), the risk exposure can a priori be higher with risk reporting than without risk reporting. This ex ante increase in risk is the more likely, a) the higher the a priori probability of rather high asset risk, b) the higher (smaller) the di erence between the risk exposure with risk reporting and the risk exposure without risk reporting if the bank is rather risky (riskless) without risk reporting.
Proof: See appendix A.9, p. 27.
A priori risk reporting leads to an increase in insolvency risk compared to the scenario without risk reporting if it is ex ante expected that the risk increasing e ect on risky types of banks more than compensates the risk decreasing e ect on quite riskless types of banks. Two factors are important for this result: rstly, the a priori probabilities of the possible types of banks, and secondly, the di erences between asset risk with risk reporting and asset risk without risk reporting of the di erent t ypes of banks. If the probability of rather risky types is high or the di erence between asset risk with risk reporting and asset risk without risk reporting is high (small) if the bank is rather risky (riskless) without risk reporting, it is more likely that ex ante expected shortfall and target semivariance are higher with risk reporting. The impact of the second factor becomes clear if we only allow for two possible types of banks: a risky bank and a riskless bank.
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In case of risk reporting the risky bank becomes even more risky whereas the riskless bank still bears no risk. Regardless of the a priori probabilities of both types of banks, we observe an increase in the risk exposure due to risk reporting.
Conclusion
In this paper the impact of a bank's risk reporting on the equilibium behaviour of the bank and its depositors has been analysed. We have shown that risk reporting may not only 20 Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) refer to this special case when they state that the ex ante probability of bank insolvency increases.
lead to a decrease but also to a rise in the bank's risk exposure. A nal evaluation of risk reporting depends on which of the di erent equilibria in the benchmark scenario actually occurs. If the lack of risk disclosure leads to adverse selection becauseonly in case of high asset risk a bank is active in the market for deposits, risk reporting may help to overcome this problem. However, in case of a pooling equilibrium which means that an average return on deposits is contracted irrespective of asset risk, risk reporting increases risk in situations with already high asset risk and decreases it in situations which are quite riskless. We have identi ed conditions under which a pooling equilibrium is more likely so that by the introduction of risk reporting the bank is`taxed' during hard times and`rewarded' during good times (Cordella and Levy Yeyati, 1998, p. 125) . Moreover, ex ante expected shortfall and target semivariance may b e higher in case of risk reporting.
Our conclusions con rm some of the results of Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) even though the analytical frameworks di er. We do not assume a uniform or other special distribution over asset returns, thus using risk measures that are independent of the underlying distribution function. Besides, more than two possible values of asset risk are considered. Instead of looking at the investment decisions of risk neutral potential debtholders, whom Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) call depositors, we h a ve analysed the withdrawal decisions of risk averse depositors. Thus we gain additional insight i n to the impact of the depositors' prior beliefs and their risk aversion. Unlike Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) we h a ve shown that even in case of risk reporting depositors and bank may not agree on a return on deposits so that risk-based bank runs are possible.
Referring to the theory of deposit contracts and bank runs we model not only the sequential game between bank and depositors, as Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998) do, but also the simultaneous game between depositors. To our knowledge this is the rst paper that analyses the e ects of risk disclosure and takes into account the characteristics of deposit contracts. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a scenario in which the game between depositors is characterised by dominant strategies. However, a simple change in the assumption on the level of equity would lead to a di erent game between depositors. For example, we m a y assume that equity i s s o l o w that the bank becomes illiquid provided that a certain fraction of deposits is withdrawn. Then a depositor's withdrawal decision does not only depend on his information (or expectation) about asset risk but also on his beliefs concerning the other depositors' behaviour. In addition to information-based bank runs, panic runs will occur. Nevertheless, the e ects of risk reporting are quite similar to the ones described above. The opposite case, in which equity is so high that the bank does not go into liquidation even if all deposits are withdrawn, shows some di erent results. E. g., not only total, but also partial bank runs may beobserved. A detailed description of this case 19 goes far beyond the scope of this paper and will be presented somewhere else.
As another possible extension the bank might beallowed to in uence risk by changing the distribution over asset returns. In our model, nature and not the bank chooses asset risk. So the analysis is concentrated on the part o f a b a n k ' s risk that cannot behedged by the bank, e. g. because it is in uenced by macroeconomic factors. If the bank chooses asset risk, moral hazard instead of quality uncertainty is analysed in the scenario without risk reporting. However, this will not bediscussed here any more but left for future research. (5) is ful lled so that w = t. Because of (6) and (10) If the depositors are risk averse, the expected net worth at T = 2 is not generally positive. The critical return, d m 2 , is higher than in case of risk neutral depositors due to the required risk premium. The higher the absolute risk aversion, i. e. the higher ;u (10) and (12) also supports the equilibrium return on deposits, d o 2 . The depositors believe that if a bank chooses an out-of-equilibrium return on deposits, it is always the most risky bank, i. e. LPM 1 ( ) is at maximum. Because of (10) such a b a n k m a y w ant to reduce d 2 to d 1 . As the depositors would withdraw their deposits (w = 1 ) and E V (d 1 1j )] = 0 < E V (d o 2 t j )], it is not optimal for the bank to deviate from the pooling equilibrium with d o 2 .
A. 
It is more likely that this inequality is ful lled, a) if p( ) with > is high (and accordingly p( ) with ~ is very small), b) if the di erence in the last brackets is high and the absolute value of the di erence in the rst brackets is small. 
